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Abstract 
 
This paper examines an approach to estimating the net additionality of financial 
assistance to indigenously-owned firms in Ireland for the period 2000 to 2002.  Using a 
sample of Enterprise Ireland assisted-firms an innovative self-assessment case study 
methodology was adopted in order to test the ways in which estimates of partial 
deadweight can be derived.  The results show that the net additionality of Enterprise 
Ireland assistance can be estimated as around 50 per cent for this sample of case studies 
which represent a pool of clients which accounted for just-over two-thirds of the financial 
assistance provided by Enterprise Ireland in the period of the study. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
An important question in any evaluation of the effectiveness of industrial development policy 
is what would have happened to firm performance in the absence of assistance from 
government agencies whose responsibility it is to stimulate growth and competitiveness.  To 
produce an assessment of this counter-factual scenario involves considering two key 
components of additionality, they are, deadweight and displacement.  In reality, all or part of 
the growth of an assisted firm might have occurred anyway.  This is referred to as 
deadweight.  Even with the situation of ‘zero deadweight’, whereby all firms indicate that in 
the absence of financial assistance they would not have been able to create any new 
employment, there remains the possibility that assistance given to one firm displaces jobs in 
other firms within the national economy.  This concept is referred to as displacement.  Taken 
together deadweight and displacement allow some assessment of the additional impact of 
financial assistance provided by a public agency such as Enterprise Ireland which is the 
subject of this paper. 
 
The paper presents the results of a study of the net additionality of support to Irish industry 
which had the overall objective to derive estimates of deadweight and displacement in 
Enterprise Ireland (EI) assisted firms.  In order to achieve this objective the study involved 
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the application of a case study approach which involved deriving an estimate of deadweight 
and displacement based on information obtained from face-to-face interviews with the 
relevant personnel of 42 Enterprise Ireland assisted firms.  This approach is a development of 
the earlier work on Shannon Development by Lenihan (1999; 2001). 
 
Section 2 provides some background on industrial policy in Ireland and the role of Enterprise 
Ireland in particular. Section 3 of the paper sets out the main methodological issues 
associated with this impact evaluation and presents a rationale for the approach adopted by 
the study team.  Finally, Section 4 provides estimates of deadweight and displacement that 
permit an overall assessment of the net additionality of Enterprise Ireland assistance.  
 
 
2. Enterprise Ireland and Industrial Policy in Ireland 
 
With a menu of tax breaks and subsidies, Ireland has traditionally been successful in  
encouraging foreign companies to set up branches in Ireland.  In 1973, the Industrial 
Development Authority (IDA) for Ireland set out a plan to concentrate on attracting such 
investments as the electronics, chemicals and other ‘high-technology’ sectors. As the 1970s 
unfolded foreign companies that had located in the ROI before 1973 showed disturbing signs 
of weakness.  It was also realised that most of the foreign firms that located in Ireland in the 
1960s came with technically mature, labour-intensive products such as textiles, clothing, 
footwear, plastics and light engineering.  Therefore, the Irish subsidiaries (basically branch 
plants) generally required few skills to perform their operations. 
 
Since the 1980s there have been several major reports on the nature and orientation of 
industrial policy in Ireland.  In July 1980, the “Telesis Group” was commissioned by the 
National Economic and Social Council (NESC) to assess industrial policy.  Telesis concluded 
that industrial policy in Ireland suffered from a lack of a clear regional focus and an over-
emphasis on capital grants to firms.  Further, it recommended that: 
 
• tax-based lending should be diverted away from the non-traded sector;  
• firms should be encouraged to adopt a strategic approach to their business;  
• greater amount of government resources should be earmarked for the growth of 
the domestic traded sector;  
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• government should use ‘carrots and sticks’ to encourage domestic firms to engage 
in skilled sub-supply;  
• greater efforts should be made to induce foreign firms to contribute to the 
development of domestic firms; overemphasis on foreign industry;   
• the development of an internationally competitive indigenous base.   
 
The main recommendations of the Telesis report were given support in the Irish 
Government's “Industrial Policy White Paper” in 1984.   
 
The Culliton Report (1992) took these developments a step further by recommending a 
reorganisation of existing grant awarding agencies into two main agencies, one of which 
should address the needs of indigenous firms, the other should focus on the attraction of 
foreign owned industry.  Of major importance was the conclusion that greater use should be 
made of equity as opposed to non-repayable grants and the emphasis upon the promotion of 
growth-oriented industrial clusters.  In 1993 the agencies responsible for industrial policy 
were restructured - ‘Forbairt’ was established to promote indigenous industry and the IDA 
was given a mandate to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  
 
The “Task Force on Small Business” (1994) resulted in two key policy initiatives.  First, the 
“Small Business Operational Programme" and second, “Shaping our Future - A strategy for 
Enterprise in Ireland in the 21st Century”, which together provided a longer-term strategic 
framework for the promotion and subsequent development of an enterprise sector in Ireland. 
The "Operational Programme for Industrial Development 1994-1999” focussed on helping 
firms, particularly small indigenous firms increase sales over the five year period 1994-1999.  
In July 1998 ‘Forbairt’ ceased to exist and a new agency with responsibility for indigenous 
industry, ‘Enterprise Ireland’ was established.  Enterprise Ireland (EI) was established in 
1998.  
 
Enterprise Ireland works with Irish industry and has a client list containing over 3,000 Irish 
manufacturing and internationally traded service companies.  Its objective is to stimulate 
growth and competitiveness in existing Irish companies through the exploration of new ideas 
and markets as well as assisting the creation of "High Potential Start-Up Companies" 
(HPSUs).  
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3. Methodology: the Case Study Approach 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The case study approach involved the use of a structured questionnaire with respondents 
during face-to-face interviews which lasted approximately 45 minutes.  The respondents 
comprised the relevant personnel (e.g. managing directors, accountants, financial controllers) 
of firms that received financial assistance from EI during the years 2000 and 2001.  The 
reason that the face-to-face interview technique was adopted was that in the case of EI 
assisted firms large quantities of relevant published data were not available.  Therefore the 
only true way to get a grip on the levels of deadweight and displacement associated with EI 
assistance was to interview the recipients of financial assistance.  The interview approach is 
also useful for examining the underlying processes at work, that is, cause and effect.   
 
To be included in the survey the following definition of an assisted Enterprise Ireland firm 
was adopted.  The firms (excluding those firms which had received only RTI and e-business 
support) must have been approved a package of assistance of more than €127,000 in the year 
2000 and that by the time of the proposed interview (Autumn 2002) at least 50 per cent of 
that assistance had been paid.  Due to the difficulty of recruiting the required number of firms 
for the case studies this was relaxed to a 40 per cent drawdown of financial assistance and 
approvals from the first part of 2001 had to be included.  
 
In order to ensure that the 42 case studies were meaningful in the context of the EI client 
portfolio an analysis was undertaken to ascertain the scale of financial assistance received by 
the ‘pool’ of EI clients conforming to the parameters of the study.  The amount of financial 
assistance paid to EI clients defined above in the two years 2000 and 2001 was €86 million 
out of a total expenditure of €126 million (excluding universities and CEC).  Therefore, the 
42 case study firms represent just over two-thirds (68.2%) of EI expenditure in 2000 and 
2001.  On average, EI provided around 11 per cent of total costs of the projects assisted in the 
42 case study firms.  It was agreed with Enterprise Ireland that the study should incorporate 
an assessment of the effectiveness of financial assistance to both established firms 
(Expansions) and to start-up firms (HPSUs).  Overall, 12 HPSUs and 30 Expansion firms 
were included in the impact survey case studies. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the range of assistance received from Enterprise Ireland.  This data is 
compiled from the face-to face interview and not from the information held on file by 
Enterprise Ireland. The most common form of financial assistance from Enterprise Ireland 
was share capital (mostly in the form of preference shares) followed by financial assistance 
associated with employment and training.  Beyond this financial assistance with feasibility 
studies and R&D capability aspects of the project was acknowledged by between 25-30 per 
cent of the sample firms. 
 
Two major differences between HPSUs and Expansions with respect to the nature of the 
assistance received is evident.  First, HPSUs stated that they were more likely to be in receipt 
of ordinary shares compared to Expansion firms.  Second, Expansions were more likely to 
have received financial assistance for training staff.  
 
 
 
3.2  The Survey Questionnaire 
 
A questionnaire was used to give structure and to ensure consistency during face-to-face 
interviews.  The goal of standardised measurement is central to survey research.  It is 
Figure 1:  Nature of Assistance from Enterprise Ireland
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considered imperative to keep the wording of questions standard across respondents.  As 
Barnekov and Hart (1993) outlined: 
 
“Increasingly, it is being realised that the way in which questions are posed is as important 
to a successful evaluation as the methods which are used to analyse the information 
collected” (page 1471).   
 
The ultimate aim of the interview technique is to utilise the views of individuals (firms) 
directly affected by policy in an attempt to identify a ‘without policy' position, that is, 
‘counter-factual position'.   As Reid (1995) stated: 
 
"Field work methods which involve intensive interviews with respondents offer the 
potential for very accurate and complete data and very high response rates" 
(page 15). 
 
There are, as one would expect, inherent difficulties associated with the face-to-face 
interview technique.  The key point is that such a qualitative approach to policy evaluation is 
people centred.  The approach relies on the accuracy of the perceptions of decision makers 
with respect to their ‘counter-factual position', as well as honesty and candidness regarding 
sensitive issues.   
 
It should always be borne in mind that firms have an interest in the continuation of public 
support and may thus, over-emphasise the effect assistance has (and thus underestimate the 
level of deadweight for example) for fear that findings might influence authorities to giving 
them less or in the extreme case no assistance next time round.  It could also be argued that 
respondents may be reluctant to openly admit that an external input has influenced firm 
behaviour and hence under-emphasise the effects.  In this case, respondents may attribute 
success to their own efforts, motivation, foresight etc.  This notion of respondents being 
careful with their responses is generally termed the ‘respondents effect’.  Another possibility 
is that respondents simply do not know all the possible effects their investments may cause.   
 
 As King (1990) argued: 
 
“Memory and the evidence of documentation that is inevitably selective, can 
easily distort ones views of the balance of probabilities in hypothetical 
circumstances some years in the past” (page 49).   
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An additional frequently cited criticism of the survey/interview methodological approach 
regards the issues of ‘snapshot’ approach and timing. Evaluation is often a ‘one-off’ exercise 
conducted soon after a policy intervention has ended or even while it is still in operation.  As 
a follow on from this, there may be an underestimation or overestimation of deadweight.  
This is due to the fact that many government interventions have associated delay effects.  
Their positive impact may diminish with time, whereas effects such as displacement may 
take some time to come to the surface.  This implies, therefore, that the timing of face-to-face 
interviews is of utmost importance.  It is very difficult to say what the ideal is.  Ultimately, 
the researcher is faced with a trade-off between (a) allowing enough time for the full impacts 
of policy to take effect and (b) not delaying the evaluation for too long so that respondents 
can still recall, in detail, the impacts of the policy intervention as clearly as possible.  The 
problems associated with issues of memory and evidence of documentation, as outlined by 
King (1990), are key issues of concern here.  
 
To ensure that respondents offered a ‘consistent counterfactual scenario’ and adapted as 
easily as possible to the hypothetical line of questioning regarding assistance received from 
EI, the following measures were undertaken by the research team; 
 
• Respondents were telephoned to explain what the interview would entail.  Therefore, 
(based on previous experience by the research team) by the time the interviewer 
arrived, respondents were quite ready to answer questions regarding the counter-
factual type scenario.  This level of focus is necessary given the plethora of assistance 
measures available to firms in the Republic of Ireland.   
 
• The research team insisted that interviews were only carried out with the                
respondents who were directly involved in the application for financial assistance. 
This should ensure a high level of accuracy and reliability regarding the information 
provided.  Further, all interviews were tape-recorded to ensure an accurate record of 
the interview.  Transcripts were also made to facilitate subsequent analysis and 
interpretation by the research team. 
 
• The questionnaire was piloted on three firms to ensure questions were clear and that 
there was no confusion regarding the issues addressed.  This is imperative when 
dealing with such sensitive issues as deadweight and displacement.   The piloted 
firms took part in a “participating” pre-test, that is, they were told that it was a 
practice run and were asked to explain their reactions and answers. Following the 
‘piloting’, some very minor adjustments were made to the questionnaire.  These 
adjustments regarded the meaning, difficulty and ordering of questions being asked.  
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The ‘flow’ and ‘naturalness’ of the questionnaire was also improved on, in an attempt 
to guarantee respondent interest and attention.   
 
 
3.3  Structure of the Questionnaire  
 
This section focuses on the details (and underlying rationale) of the  questions posed.  As a 
starting point, the questionnaire tried to establish whether the recipient of financial assistance 
was a first time or repeat client of EI. The rationale for addressing this question is that it is 
generally believed that start-up assistance have more impact on firms than do subsequent 
financial assistance.   The remainder of the questionnaire focused on the specifics of the 
financial assistance received by the firm from EI.    
 
Given that deadweight and displacement are sensitive issues, some general questions were 
asked of respondents to begin with, to settle them into the interview, before addressing the 
two pertinent issues of interest.  As Reid (1995) states: "Lowering the possibility level of 
threat in an interview by starting with benign general question" (page 10). 
 
In the preliminary stages of the interview, recipients of financial assistance were asked 
questions regarding the following: year firm was established, legal form of company, main 
types of products/services of company, type of financial assistance received from EI, 
description of project aided (including project aims and objectives) and so on.  Once these 
preliminary questions were addressed, questions which served as measures of deadweight 
were then asked.  This technique was also used to ease the interviewee into the deadweight 
line of questioning.  The words deadweight and displacement were never used at any stage 
by the interviewer during interviews.  The following line of questioning was pursued (which 
serves as useful measures of deadweight) of respondents: did you undertake a financial 
appraisal of the project?  If yes, did this appraisal include financial assistance from EI?  The 
general belief here is that (as per Sheehan, 1993) if financial assistance is included as part of 
the investment appraisal then it is likely that the recipient really needed the assistance for the 
project to go ahead (implying low levels of deadweight).  On the other hand, where financial 
assistance is omitted, it is generally believed that this implies high deadweight levels. 
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3.4  Estimating Deadweight 
 
To assess deadweight directly, the following line of questioning was pursued: Respondents 
were asked to answer the hypothetical question of what would most likely have happened 
(with hindsight) if they had not received financial assistance from Enterprise Ireland for the 
specific year in question.  More precisely, respondents were asked: 
 
“In the absence of financial assistance from EI (in 2000 or 2001 depending on when 
intervention occurred)) would you have (choose one option only)? 
 
a) Gone ahead as now unchanged, that is, same scale, time and location. 
b) Gone  ahead but at a different location, (i.e. outside of Ireland) (Request precise 
details in follow up questions). 
c) Gone ahead at a later date (i.e. delayed the project) (request precise details in follow 
up questions). 
d) Gone ahead but on a reduced scale (i.e. changed the nature of the project-removed 
certain features such as the research function) (request precise details). 
e) Combination of c. and d. (request precise details in follow up questions). 
f) Abandoned the project (request precise details in follow up questions).” 
 
When respondents replied that in the absence of the financial assistance their projects would 
have gone ahead elsewhere, on a smaller scale, at a later date, or a combination of later date 
and reduced scale they were asked for precise details of these alternative scenarios.   
 
The above questions facilitate estimates of ‘partial’ versus ‘pure’ ('full') degrees of 
deadweight, and help to provide a picture of what was most likely to have happened if the 
award had not been made.  Option (a) implies ‘pure’ ('full') deadweight.  Options (b), (c), (d) 
and (e) all imply ‘partial’ degrees of deadweight; option (f) implies zero deadweight.     
 
In an attempt to quantify the impact of financial assistance received from EI, firms were also 
asked to assess the number of jobs in their company which ‘are now’ directly dependent on 
the financial assistance received from EI for the specific year in question (2000 or 2001).  
They were also asked to quantify the percentage of current turnover and exports attributable 
to the financial assistance received from EI for the specific year in question.    
 
As a final measure of deadweight, firms were probed regarding their access to alternative 
sources of funding (as per Robinson and Wren 1987).  More precisely, they were asked:  
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"How would you have obtained the extra funds needed if no financial assistance was 
provided to you by EI? 
 
• Internal funds 
• Bank 
• Alternative grant (specify source) 
• Other, please specify……….." 
 
As a follow-up question, they were also probed with regards to how successful they think 
they would have been in accessing these alternative sources.  To minimise deadweight, firms 
should be able to satisfactorily demonstrate that all other avenues of finance have been 
exhausted.   
 
 
3.5  Estimating Displacement 
 
The questionnaire attempted to seek information from the owner-managers on two areas 
which together can be used to derive an estimate of displacement.  First, to establish the 
extent to which EI assisted firms sell their products nationally rather than internationally.  
This was addressed by asking the following question: “What percentage of your current 
sales are made in each of the following markets?  Ireland, UK (including Northern Ireland), 
Other EU, Other Non-EU”. 
 
Second, to establish the extent to which sales by EI assisted firms displaces output from other 
national firms rather than imports.  This was assessed by the following questions: “How 
many competitors do you have? (I mean businesses you compete with in your main markets)” 
and “Who are your competitors and where are they based?” The assumption here is that 
where most competitors are known to be situated nationally, there is a strong assumption that 
displacement will occur within the assisted area, that is, nationally.  However, where 
competitors are located abroad there is a presumption of no displacement of assisted area 
jobs.  Combining these two pieces of information allows us to derive an estimate of 
displacement for the case study firms. 
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4. The Additionality of Enterprise Ireland Support  
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
In this section an evaluative framework is provided in which the 'additionality' (in terms of 
deadweight and displacement) associated with the assistance approved by firms in 2000 or 
2001 is examined.  The years 2000 or 2001 were chosen as these were the most recent years 
for which information regarding financial assistance approvals was available at the outset of 
this research project.   
 
4.2 Estimating Deadweight    
 
4.2.1 Categories of Deadweight 
 
In this study, deadweight is defined as the degree to which projects would have gone ahead 
without financial assistance from Enterprise Ireland in 2000 or 2001.  As discussed above the 
estimates of deadweight are based on a self-assessment of the counterfactual by the owner-
manager of the firm and as a result may be subject to a respondent’s effect in both directions.  
That is, an under or over exaggeration of the effects of EI financial assistance.  In this study 
an attempt to minimise this ‘respondent effect’ was undertaken by the way survey questions 
were designed and utilised in the owner-manager face-to-face interviews.   A related issue 
concerns the possibility of bias introduced into the analysis by the random effect of who 
agreed to be interviewed within the time-scale set aside for the case studies.  This problem is 
controlled for by a series of sensitivity analyses which were designed to isolate the effects of 
those firms (‘big influencers’) which were having an undue effect on the estimates of the 
impact of EI assistance. 
 
The impact of financial assistance provided to firms by Enterprise Ireland is measured in 
terms of the net change in employment between date of financial assistance approved and 
date of interview.  The percentage of jobs maintained, along with those lost and gained, and 
the total number of jobs lost or gained over the study period is calculated.  In order to 
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estimate deadweight it is necessary to calculate how many of these jobs would still have been 
created without assistance, that is, how many are truly additional.   
 
The definition of deadweight used in this study takes account of the various degrees or levels 
of deadweight measured by time, location and scale (or a combination).  The issue here is to 
establish which projects would have gone ahead but in a different form, for example, scaled-
down version, or in a different location, or at a later date, without the assistance.  When 
respondents said that in the absence of assistance their project would have gone ahead 
elsewhere, on a smaller scale, or at a later date, they were asked for precise details of these 
alternative scenarios.  These questions facilitated estimates of ‘partial’ versus ‘pure’ ('full') 
degrees of deadweight and helped to provide a picture of what was most likely to have 
happened if the award had not been made.  Table 1 shows the responses to the different 
categories of deadweight for the sample firms. 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, the vast majority of firms (73.8%) fit into the ‘partial’ 
deadweight categories.  More precisely, 35.7 per cent fit into the ‘reduced scale’ category, 
followed by 28.6 per cent fitting into the ‘later date and reduced scale’ category with a 
smaller number of firms in the ‘later date’ (7.1%) and ‘different location and later date’ 
(2.4%) partial deadweight categories.  Finally, 19 per cent of firms reported ‘pure’ (100%) 
deadweight with 7.1 per cent of firms reporting ‘zero’ deadweight.   Therefore, it is possible 
to conclude that 81 per cent of the case study firms were impacted to some degree by the 
financial assistance provided by EI. 
 
From these results we conclude that at the lower end of the spectrum deadweight can be 
broadly estimated for EI financial assistance as 19 per cent1.  In other words, across the 
sample we can state that this proportion of firms did not need any assistance from EI to 
undertake and complete their business development project.   This estimate has been used 
widely in many studies which seek to provide an estimate of the counter-factual position 
using the self-assessment methodology used in this study. 
                                                 
1 Of the 42 firms in the sample, 7 (16.7%) firms would have grown at the same rate; 27 (64.3%) would have 
grown more slowly; 7 (16.7%) would gave declined and finally one (2.4%) respondent replied that he was 
unsure.   These findings enable us to derive another ‘crude’ deadweight estimate of 16.7 per cent. This, in 
itself, provides a useful check on the self-assessment methodology for ‘pure’ deadweight.   
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Table 1:  Deadweight Categories (Owner-Manager Self-Assessment) 
Deadweight Category Percentage of Firms (no. of firms) 
Pure (100%) deadweight (a) 19% (8) 
Partial deadweight (b) 
(different location) 
0%  (0) 
Partial deadweight (c)   
(later date) 
7.1% (3) 
Partial deadweight (d)   
(reduced scale) 
35.7% (15) 
Partial deadweight (e) 
(later date and reduced scale) 
28.6% (12) 
Partial deadweight (f) 
(different location and later date) 
2.4% (1) 
Zero deadweight (g) 7.1% (3) 
(a) Pure deadweight implies the firm would have gone ahead with the  
 project  at the same scale, time and location in the absence of assistance from  EI in 
2000/2001. 
(b) Partial deadweight (different location) implies firm would have gone  
ahead with the project at a different location but otherwise unchanged. 
(c) Partial deadweight (later date) implies firm would have gone ahead  
 with the project at a later date but otherwise unchanged (that is,  
 delayed the project). 
(d) Partial deadweight (reduced scale) implies firm would have gone  
 ahead with the project anyway at a reduced scale but otherwise  
 unchanged. 
(e) Partial deadweight implies a combination of later date and reduced  
 scale but  otherwise unchanged. 
(f) Partial deadweight implies a combination of different location and  
 later date but otherwise unchanged. 
(g) Zero deadweight implies firm would have abandoned the project in  
 the absence of assistance from EI in 2000/2001. 
Source:  Enterprise Ireland Impact Survey (2002) 
 
 
However, this still leaves unresolved the issue of partial deadweight and how that can be 
combined with the 'pure' deadweight estimate of 19 per cent in order to arrive at a more 
sensitive and realistic estimate of deadweight.  This project used an innovative methodology 
which was designed to calibrate in terms of employment a measure of deadweight which 
incorporates a range of partial deadweight options.   
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4.2.2 An Evaluative Framework for Estimating Deadweight 
 
In Table 2 the net change in employment for the 42 firms in the sample between the year of 
the EI financial assistance (either 2000 or 2001) and 2002 is calculated.  For the purposes of 
this analysis the employment data from the Forfás Employment Survey was used.  It shows 
the percentage of jobs maintained along with those lost and gained, and the total numbers of 
jobs lost or gained over the study period.  Overall, just under 50 per cent of firms lost jobs or 
experienced no change in terms of employee numbers.  The other half of firms increased the 
number they employed during the study period.  Overall, the total number of jobs gained was 
53.  To estimate deadweight it is necessary to calculate how many of these jobs would still 
have been created without financial assistance, that is, how many of these jobs can be 
considered as truly additional. 
 
 
Table 2:  Net Employment Change – Case Studies 
 
Number 
(percentage) of firms 
Percentage of jobs 
lost or gained 
Total number of jobs 
 lost or gained 
(net employment change) 
17 (40.5) decrease -222 
3 (7.1%) no change 0 
22 (52.4%) increase 275 
Total jobs gained:   53 
Source:  Enterprise Ireland Impact Survey (2002) 
 
 
4.2.3 Net Employment Change Accounting for EI Impact  
 
The impact of Enterprise Ireland assistance is measured in terms of changes in employment 
over the study period.  For the purpose of calculating net employment change accounting for 
additionality a number of assumptions were made about the change in employment during 
the study period.  The assumptions are as follows: 
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• The assumption for those firms which fit into the ‘pure’ deadweight category is that 
there was zero impact in terms of employment over the study period.    This occurs in 
the case of 8 firms (e.g. one of the firms in the sample employed 15 people in 2000, 
this figure increased to 22 in 2002.  Thus net employment change over the study 
period in the case of that firm equals 7.  Given that the firm opted for the ‘pure’ 
deadweight option, we can assume that there is no impact of EI assistance in terms of 
employment.  Therefore, for that particular firm net employment change accounting 
for additionality equals 7 jobs).   
 
• The following subset of assumptions are made regarding firms that fit into the ‘partial 
deadweight’ categories2: 
 
- Alternative location.  All of the jobs occurring in firms that would have chosen an 
alternative location outside of Ireland will be counted as additional, and thus do 
not affect the net employment-change figure (the inherent assumption being that 
without financial assistance from EI these additional jobs would not have accrued 
nationally).  In instances where the ‘alternative location’ option was relevant 
respondents were asked the following questions “Where would the project have 
been located outside Ireland” and “Why would you have chosen this location?” 
 
- Later date (delayed project).  The inherent assumption here is that the jobs have 
been in existence for either 1 or 2 years (depending on whether EI assisted the 
firm in 2000 or 2001).3  For example, if we assume that the jobs have been in 
existence for two years, then, if a project was brought forward by six months 
because of financial assistance then the remaining eighteen months are regarded 
as deadweight. For example, take a firm which would have delayed the project by 
eighteen months in the absence of assistance: the firm’s net employment change 
equals eight jobs; however, net employment-change accounting for deadweight 
equals 75 per cent of 8, that is 6 jobs.  In instances where the “Later date (delayed 
project)” option was relevant respondents were asked the following questions 
“By how long would the project have been delayed? (in terms of months)” and 
“Why would the project have started up/expanded at this later date” 
 
- Reduced Scale.  Reduced scale is examined in terms of direct questions to 
respondents such as “By how much would you have reduced the scale of the 
project?  If relevant the respondent was asked to indicate whether this could be 
expressed in terms of ‘numbers employed’, ‘size of premises or nature of 
equipment installed’ ‘sales to particular markets’ ‘Research and Development’, ‘ 
amount of training envisaged’.  The impact of reduced scale in terms of numbers 
employed is used to specifically measure the impact on employment (e.g. one of 
                                                 
2 ‘Partial deadweight’ is defined in terms of scale, time, location or a combination of time and 
scale or location and later date.     
3 Take the hypothetical example of a firm that received financial assistance  from EI in 2000 
whereas face-to-face interviews were not carried out until 2002 (that is, 2 years later).  Thus the 
inherent assumption here is that these jobs have been in existence for two years.  Alternatively, for 
those firms that received assistance in 2001 the inherent assumption is that the jobs have been in 
existence for one year.   
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the firms in the sample had a net employment change over the study period of –2.  
When asked about how much the project would have been reduced in terms of 
numbers employed in the absence of EI assistance, the respondent replied 6 jobs.  
Therefore, the impact of EI assistance equals 6 jobs.  Thus, net employment 
change accounting for additionality equals –8).  In cases where respondents 
replied that there was no employment change (but reduced scale would have been 
in the form of sales to particular markets, R&D, or amount of training envisaged) 
or they felt that there was an effect in terms of numbers employed but were 
unable to quantify the impact, the % contribution of EI financial assistance to the 
overall financing of the project was used as a proxy for reduced scale (this 
information was ascertained in response to the question “How was the project 
financed in total? Enterprise Ireland assistance, Internal Funds, Bank Loan, 
Equity etc”).  For example, where a financial accounts for 30 per cent of total 
financing, then the assumption will be made that the scale of the project would 
have been reduced by 30 per cent in the absence of the financial and thus the net 
employment-change has been reduced by 30 per cent. 
 
- Combination of later date and reduced scale: summation of 2 and 3 as detailed 
above. 
 
 
- Combination of different location and later date: summation of 1 and 2 as 
detailed above. 
 
 
• If the project would have been abandoned without financial assistance from 
Enterprise Ireland, the assumption was that all of the jobs in this category were fully 
additional, that is, ‘zero deadweight’ (the same logic is used in the case of firms who 
either increased, maintained or decreased the numbers of jobs over the study period).   
 
 
At the time of the interviews with the owner-managers of the 42 case studies the Irish 
economy had been experiencing a rather mixed performance with a result that almost half of 
the firms had actually declined in terms of employment since they had received assistance 
from EI in 2000 or 2001 (see Table 2).  This had a major impact on the methodology 
designed to measure partial deadweight in that for the sample overall this produced a 
negative figure for “net employment change accounting for additionality” because the 
overall calculation of the impact of EI assistance in terms of employment was negative.  As a 
result it was decided to undertake the deadweight estimate for two groups of firms depending 
on their employment performance: 
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• Increase or no change in employment 
• Decline in employment 
 
Table 3 incorporates the above assumptions in an estimation of deadweight for the firms in 
the sample who had increased or experienced no change in employment. The net 
employment change over the study period for these 25 firms was 275 jobs.   The overall 
impact of EI financial assistance in terms of employment equals 146.2 jobs (i.e. 146 jobs).  
The net employment change figure for jobs accounting for additionality equals 128.8 (i.e. 
129 jobs).  In other words because of EI financial assistance, there was an increase of 146 
jobs over the study period.  Thus, deadweight for this group of firms is given by: 
 
Deadweight = 275 jobs - 146 jobs/275 jobs *100 = 46.9% 
 
that is, 46.9 per cent of the additional jobs would have occurred anyway.  Thus additionality, 
net of deadweight, is 53.1 per cent of the jobs created. 
 
 
Table 3  Additionality and Deadweight (Increase/Static only) 
 
    Number of      
  Employees in 
 
 
Deadweight 
Category  
 
2000/2001    2002 
Net 
Employment 
change 
Impact of EI 
assistance in 
terms of 
employment 
Counterfactual 
(expressed in 
terms of net 
employment 
change) 
Pure 305 387 82 0 82 
Alternative 
location 
- - - - - 
Later date 33 42 9 9 0 
Reduced scale 510 581 71 44.8 26.2 
Later date and 
reduced scale 
307 373 66 45.4 20.6 
Different 
location and 
later date 
95 103 8 8 0 
Zero 
(Project 
abandoned) 
16 55 39 39 0 
Total: 1266 1541 275 146.2 128.8 
Source:  Enterprise Ireland Impact Survey (2002) 
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This estimate of deadweight included 6 firms who had indicated that in the absence of EI 
financial assistance they would have gone ahead with their project anyway.  Table 4 repeats 
the analysis for only those firms recording partial deadweight responses and had recorded a 
net increase or static change in employment since they had received EI financial assistance 
(n=19).   The net employment change over the study period for these 19 firms was 193 jobs.   
The overall impact of EI financial assistance in terms of employment remains 146.2 jobs (i.e. 
146 jobs) as the 6 firms removed from the analysis had zero jobs associated with EI 
assistance.  The net employment change figure for jobs accounting for additionality equals 
46.2 (i.e. 46 jobs).  In other words because of EI financial assistance, there was an increase of 
146 jobs over the study period.  Thus, deadweight for this group of firms is given by: 
 
Deadweight = 193 jobs - 146 jobs/193 jobs *100 = 24.4% 
 
that is, 24.4 per cent of the additional jobs would have occurred anyway.  Thus additionality, 
net of deadweight, is 75.6 per cent of the jobs created. 
 
 
Table 4  Additionality and Deadweight (Increase/Static Partial 
Deadweight Category only) 
 
    Number of      
  Employees in 
 
 
Deadweight 
Category (a) 
 
2000/2001    2002 
Net 
Employment 
change 
Impact of EI 
assistance in 
terms of 
employment 
Counterfactual 
(expressed in 
terms of net 
employment 
change) 
Pure - - - - - 
Alternative 
location 
- - - - - 
Later date 33 42 9 9 0 
Reduced scale 510 581 71 44.8 26.2 
Later date and 
reduced scale 
307 373 66 45.4 20.6 
Different location 
and later date 
95 103 8 8 0 
Zero 
(Project 
abandoned) 
16 55 39 39 0 
Total: 961 1154 193 146.2 46.8 
Source:  Enterprise Ireland Impact Survey (2002) 
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Turning to those case study firms (n=17) who recorded a net decline in employment in the 
period under analysis we must utilise a different conceptual approach.  For each of these 
firms the impact of EI financial assistance is calculated in the same way but, in the context of 
declining net overall employment, the counterfactual must be expressed in terms of jobs 
maintained or safeguarded.  Accordingly, it is now possible to estimate that the number of 
jobs maintained or safeguarded over the period 2000/2001 to 2002 was 100.79 (i.e., 101 
jobs).  These jobs represent 6.7 per cent of the base employment (1,498 jobs) in these firms.  
However, for the purposes of creating an estimate of additionality the number of jobs 
maintained or safeguarded can be expressed as a percentage of the total net employment loss 
(222 jobs) within this group of firms (45.4%).  In other words in the absence of EI financial 
assistance to these 17 firms the scale of job loss would have been more than twice as much 
again – that is, additionality is estimated as 45.4 per cent.  Focusing only on those firms in 
this group who were in the partial deadweight category (i.e., excluding the two firms who 
would have gone ahead with the project anyway) the number of jobs maintained or 
safeguarded as a result of EI financial assistance remains the same (i.e., 101 jobs) but the 
total net employment loss falls to 211 jobs.  Therefore, in this case additionality is estimated 
as 47.8 per cent. 
 
In summary, therefore, the case study approach has resulted in four estimates of 
additionality for the impact of EI financial assistance: 
 
• 53.1% (deadweight = 46.9%) for those firms with a net increase/static employment 
change (pure and partial deadweight categories) 
 
• 75.6% (deadweight = 24.4%) or those firms with a net increase/static employment 
change (partial deadweight categories only) 
 
• 45.4% (deadweight = 54.6%) for those firms with a net decline in employment (pure 
and partial deadweight categories) 
 
• 47.8% (deadweight = 52.2%) for those firms with a net decline in employment 
(partial deadweight categories only) 
 
 
Another way of aggregating these results is to return to the self-assessment categories of 
deadweight presented above in Table 1.  Using the above estimates of 
deadweight/additionality for the partial deadweight categories (i.e., 24.4% and 52.2% 
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deadweight) we can now construct a simplified overall estimate of deadweight based on the 
proportion of firms in each category (Table 5).  The final column presents the results of this 
exercise and was calculated as follows.  First, 19 per cent of the case study firms can be 
attributed a deadweight estimate of 100 per cent as they would have gone ahead with the 
project regardless of EI financial assistance.  Second, 73.8 per cent of the firms were 
categorised as recording partial deadweight and these can be split into a further two groups: 
those with a net increase or no change in employment (42.8%) and those who had a net 
employment decline (31%).  Using the partial deadweight estimates of 24.4 and 52.2 per cent 
for these two groups (derived from the two approaches outlined above), and multiplying by 
the proportion of firms in each group, this results in estimates of partial deadweight of 10.5 
and 16.7 per cent respectively.  Third, those firms who indicated that they would have 
completely abandoned the project in the absence of EI financial assistance were attributed a 
deadweight estimate of 0 per cent. 
 
 
Table 5  Deadweight Categories and Estimates 
Deadweight 
Category 
Percentage of 
Firms  
(No. of firms) 
Deadweight 
Estimate 
Weighted 
Deadweight 
Estimate 
Pure (100%) deadweight 19% (8) 100% 19.0% 
Partial deadweight 
(different location) 
0%  (0) 
Partial deadweight 
(later date) 
 
7.1% (3) 
Partial deadweight 
(reduced scale) 
 
35.7% (15) 
Partial deadweight 
(later date and reduced scale) 
 
28.6% (12) 
Partial deadweight  
(different location and later 
date) 
 
2.4% (1) 
 
 
 
24.4% 
(increase/static) 
n=18 
 
 
52.2% 
(decline) 
n=13 
 
 
 
10.5% 
 
 
16.7% 
 
Zero deadweight 7.1% (3) 0% 0% 
Overall Estimate of 
Deadweight 
  46.2% 
Source:  Enterprise Ireland Impact Survey (2002) 
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Summing these four weighted deadweight estimates we arrive at an overall deadweight 
estimate of 46.2% (i.e., additionality of 53.8%) for the impact of EI financial assistance on 
the 42 case study firms.  This lies within the range of additionality estimates presented above 
(45.4% to 75.6%) which are based solely on our methodology of calculating an 
counterfactual at the individual firm.  
 
We must also bear in mind that, as was established above, the firms included in the survey 
were drawn from a population of EI clients which represent just over two-thirds of EI 
expenditure in the period chosen for this study. 
 
 
4.3 A Framework for Estimating Displacement 
 
4.3.1 An Overall Estimate 
 
The second element in the calculation of the additionality of Enterprise Ireland assistance is 
displacement.  The questions adopted in the case study interviews to capture an estimate of 
displacement have already been outlined earlier in the paper.  Following on from these 
questions it can be seen that in the current study on average 36.2 per cent of the survey firms’ 
sales were sold nationally.  The remainder of sales were thus sold internationally. 
 
Table 6 shows (a) the percentage of the survey firms’ sales which are sold nationally, and (b) 
the percentage of sales by the survey firms which compete mainly with other firms 
nationally.  Both (a) and (b) are used to calculate displacement nationally (i.e. the 
displacement associated with EI intervention in Ireland).  One would assume, therefore, that 
where there is a strong tendency towards export markets, regarding sales and competitors, 
that displacement would be lower.  Table 6 uses information regarding (a) and (b) to derive 
an estimate for displacement associated with EI financial assistance over the study period. 
 
From Table 6 one can see that 36.2 per cent of firms’ sales were sold nationally (the 
remainder were sold internationally).  22.3 per cent of sales, by survey firms, competed 
mainly with other firms nationally (i.e. import substitution thus occurred in 77.7% of sales). 
Bringing these two figures together an estimate for displacement of 8.1 per cent is derived 
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(that is, 36.2% of 22.3%).  From this it can be concluded that 8.1 per cent of sales from EI 
assisted firms displaces output and jobs from other Irish firms.  The remainder of this section 
provides some disaggregated estimates of displacement within the sample of case study 
firms.  Although this level of disaggregation was not undertaken for the deadweight estimates 
due to the potential increased error term associated with even smaller numbers of 
respondents on self-assessment questions, we do this with some confidence for displacement 
due to the more factual nature of the information demanded from the owner-manager. 
 
Table 6:  Towards an Estimate for Displacement  
 
% of firms’ sales sold 
nationally  (a) 
% of sales by survey firms which 
   compete mainly with other firms  
   nationally(b) 
 
36.2 
                  
22.3 
The assumption is that the remainder of sales are either sold internationally 
Import substitution4 thus occurs in 77.7% of sales 
 Source:  Enterprise Ireland Impact Survey (2002) 
 
4.3.2 HPSUs versus Expansions 
 
Bearing in mind that 12 of the 42 firms in the sample are HPSUs with the remaining 30 firms 
Expansions, this section provides a comparative analysis of displacement estimates between 
the two sets of firms.  The a priori reasoning here is that displacement will be lower for 
HPSUs on the grounds that they were assisted by EI primarily on the strength of their export 
potential. Table 7 provides a summary of displacement estimates for HPSUs compared to 
Expansions. 
 
From Table 7 one can see that, in the case of HPSUs, 29.8 per cent of firms’ sales were sold 
nationally (the remainder were sold internationally).  It has been estimated from information 
provided by the survey firms that 17 per cent of sales by HPSUs competed mainly with other 
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firms nationally (i.e. import substitution thus occurred in 83.0% of sales).   In the case of the 
Expansions in the sample, 38.8 per cent of firms’ sales were sold nationally (the remainder 
were sold internationally).  24.5 per cent of sales by Expansions competed mainly with other 
firms nationally (i.e. import substitution thus occurred in 75.5% of sales). 
 
 
Table 7:  Displacement Estimates:  HPSUs versus Expansions 
 
 % of firms’ 
sales sold 
nationally(a) 
% of survey firms who 
compete mainly with 
other firms 
nationally (b) 
Displacement 
Estimate (c) 
HPSUs 29.8 17.0 5.1 
Expansions 38.8 24.5 9.5 
 
(a)   The assumption is that the remainder are sold internationally. 
(b)   Import substitution thus occurs in 83.0 per cent of sales for HPSUs and 75.5% of sales for Expansions.  
Import substitution in this  sense implies that EI assisted firms replace imports  (international) with 
domestic (national) production. 
(c)   Bringing the figure for the percentage of firms’ sales sold nationally  together with the figure for the 
percentage of survey firms who compete mainly with  other firms nationally allows us to calculate an 
overall estimate of displacement.  For example, in the case of HPSUs (29.8% of 17.0%) = a displacement 
estimate of 5.1%.  In the case of Expansions 38.8% of  24.5% = a displacement estimate of 9.5%. 
 
Source:  Enterprise Ireland Impact Survey (2002) 
 
Bringing these figures together, an estimate for displacement of 5.1 per cent (i.e. 29.8% of 
17%) is derived in the case of the HPSU firms in the sample.  From this it can be concluded 
that 5.1 per cent of sales from EI assisted HPSU firms displaces output and jobs from other 
national firms.  The corresponding displacement figure in the case of the expansion firms in 
the sample is 9.5 per cent (i.e. 38.8% of 24.5%).  This confirms the a priori reasoning set out 
above, where one might anticipate that firms receiving assistance for expansion purposes are 
more likely to cause displacement given that over time they are more likely to have 
penetrated the market and competed more vigorously than HPSUs which are new to the 
market and therefore likely to have less immediate impact in terms of displacement.  One 
might also expect that a certain time lag effect is in place regarding the impact of 
                                                                                                                                            
4 Import substitution in this sense implies that Enterprise Ireland assisted firms replace imports with 
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displacement.  Many of the HPSUs in the sample are also in new niche highly specialised hi-
tech markets such as computer and related activities.  Such firms are therefore in all 
probability less likely to cause displacement than already existing firms who received 
assistance from EI and who are operating in more traditional sectors of the economy such as 
food and clothing.  To further test this hypothesis, the section which follows examines the 
impact of displacement in the case of hi-tech firms in computer and related service activities 
to the other firms in the sample, which to a large extent comprise manufacturing/production 
firms in the more traditional sectors of food and clothing.     
 
4.3.3 Sectoral Comparisons  
 
From Table 8 one can see that in the case of the Hi-Tech firms5 in the sample (n=19), 26.7 
per cent of firms’ sales were sold nationally (the remainder were sold internationally).  In the 
case of Hi-Tech firms 16.5 per cent of their sales competed mainly with other firms 
nationally (i.e. import substitution thus occurred in 83.5% of sales). In the case of the more 
traditional firms6 in the sample (n=23), 44.1 per cent of firms’ sales were sold nationally (the 
remainder were sold internationally).  For these more traditional firms it was ascertained that 
27.6 per cent of their sales competed mainly with other firms nationally (i.e. import 
substitution thus occurred in 72.4% of sales). 
 
Bringing the figures together, an estimate for displacement of 4.4 per cent (i.e. 26.7% of 
16.5%) is derived in the case of the Hi-Tech firms in the sample.  From this it can be 
concluded that 4.4 per cent of sales from EI assisted Hi-Tech service firms displaces output 
and jobs from other national firms.  The corresponding displacement figure in the case of the 
more traditional firms in the sample is 12.2 per cent (i.e. 44.1% of 27.6%).  Therefore, as 
anticipated in the previous section, the Hi-Tech firms in the sample, due to a combination of 
the niche markets (e.g. internet services, telematics, mobile payment platform etc) in which 
they operate combined with the high percentage of international sales and the international 
location of their competitors, are less likely to cause displacement than their counterparts in 
more traditional sectors of the Irish economy such as food, clothing, ceramic and wood. 
                                                                                                                                            
domestic (national production). 
5 For the purposes of this study this was defined as computer and related service activities. 
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Table 8:  Displacement Estimates:  A Sectoral Comparison 
 
 % of firms’ 
sales sold 
nationally(a) 
% of survey firms who 
compete mainly with 
other firms 
nationally (b) 
Displacement 
Estimate (c) 
Hi-Tech firms 26.7 16.5 4.4 
Traditional firms 44.1 27.6 12.2 
 
(a)   The assumption is that the remainder are sold internationally. 
(b)   Import substitution thus occurs in 83.5% of sales in Hi-tech firms  and 72.4% of sales in traditional 
firms.  Import substitution in this sense implies that EI assisted  firms replace imports  (international) 
with domestic (national) production. 
(c)   Bringing the figure for the percentage of firms’ sales sold nationally  together with the figure for the 
percentage of survey firms who compete mainly with other firms nationally results in an overall 
estimate of displacement .  In the case of Hi-Tech firms (26.7% of 16.5%) = a displacement estimate 
of 4.4%.  In the case of traditional firms 44.1% of 27.6% = a displacement estimate of 4.4%. 
 
Source:  Enterprise Ireland Impact Survey (2002) 
 
 
4.3.4 Size Comparisons 
 
On a priori grounds, one would expect that size of firm7 would influence displacement.  On 
the one hand, one might expect that small firms, employing less than 50 persons, are more 
likely to cause displacement given that small firms are generally more likely to sell their 
products nationally rather than to export, implying that displacement is likely to be higher.  
Hart and Scott (1994) found this in their study which assessed the contribution of selective 
financial assistance to small firms in terms of employment creation in Northern Ireland over 
the period 1986-90.  They found that displacement is a greater problem with very small 
firms.  The counter argument is also plausible.  Larger firms (employing more than 50 
persons) may be more likely to cause displacement in the sense that they may have a larger 
                                                                                                                                            
6 Defined as manufacturing/production firms in the more traditional sectors of the economy such as 
food and clothing. 
7 Size in this case is measured in terms of employment reported by firms during face-to-face interviews 
relating to the year 2002. 
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degree of market power (especially at local/regional and national levels) and may penetrate 
the market to the degree that they may end up displacing the output/employment of already 
existing firms due to their market impact.  Tervo (1990) in his study which examined Finnish 
regional incentive policy using survey data on assisted firms found that firm size was one of 
the firm characteristics to impact on displacement.  More precisely, he found that large firms 
were more likely to cause displacement effects.   
 
In Table 9, the displacement estimates in the case of small versus large firms in the sample 
are presented.  In the case of the small firms in the sample (n=24), 33.8 per cent of their sales 
were sold nationally (the remainder were sold internationally).  It was further established that 
18.5 per cent of sales by small firms competed mainly with other firms nationally (i.e. import 
substitution thus occurred in 81.5% of sales). In the case of the large firms in the sample 
(n=18), 39.4 per cent of their sales were sold nationally (the remainder were sold 
internationally).  It was further calculated that 27.7 per cent of sales, by large survey firms, 
competed mainly with other firms nationally (i.e. import substitution thus occurred in 72.3% 
of sales). 
 
Bringing the figures together, an estimate for displacement of 6.4% per cent (i.e. 33.8% of 
18.5%) is derived in the case of the small firms in the sample.  From this it can be concluded 
that 6.4 per cent of sales from EI assisted small firms displaces output and jobs from other 
national firms.  The corresponding displacement estimate for large firms in the sample is 10.9 
per cent (i.e. 39.4% of 27.7%).  
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Table 9:  Displacement Estimates:  Small versus Large firms 
 
 % of firms’  
sales sold 
nationally(a) 
% of survey firms who
compete mainly with 
other firms  
nationally (b) 
Displacement 
Estimate (c)  
Small Firms 33.8 18.5 6.4 
Large firms 39.4 27.7 10.9 
 
(a)   The assumption is that the remainder are sold internationally. 
(b)   Import substitution thus occurs in 81.5% of sales (small firms) and 72.3% of sales (large firms).  Import
substitution in this sense implies that EI assisted firms replace imports (international) with domestic 
(national) production. 
(c)   Bringing the figure for the percentage of firms’ sales sold nationally  together with the figure for the 
percentage of survey firms who compete  mainly with  other firms nationally results in the overall 
displacement estimate. In the case of small firms (33.8% of 18.5%) = a displacement estimate of 6.4%. 
the case of large firms 39.4% of 27.7% = a displacement estimate of 10.9%. 
 
Source:  Enterprise Ireland Impact Survey (2002) 
 
 
4.3.5 Summary on Displacement 
 
The evidence in this section points to an estimate of displacement associated with EI 
financial assistance lying within the range 4.4 to 12.2 per cent.  The estimates towards the 
lower end of the range are associated with HPSUs, Hi-Tech firms and small firms while the 
higher estimates are found within larger firms, Expansions and more traditional activities.  
The overall estimate of displacement for the 42 firms in the sample is 8.1 per cent 
 
 
4.4 Towards an Estimate of Additionality 
 
 
Using the above estimates of deadweight and displacement it is possible to arrive at some 
overall sense of the net additionality of EI assistance to Irish industry in the period under 
review.   The summary estimate of deadweight presented in Table 5 was 46.2 per cent and 
Evaluating the Net Additionality of Industrial Development Assistance in Ireland 
 29 
combining this with the overall displacement estimate of 8.1 per cent we arrive at an estimate 
of net additionality of EI assistance in terms of employment for the sample firms. 
From Table 2 the net employment change for the 42 case study firms was 53 jobs in the 
period 2000/2001 to 2002.  Therefore, net employment change discounting deadweight 
(46.2%) and displacement (8.1%) can be calculated as 26.2 jobs which gives an overall 
estimate of net additionality of 49.4 per cent. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
There is no one best methodological approach to estimating the net additionality of public 
assistance to industry.  The approaches range from control group analysis using panels of 
assisted and non-assisted firms, cost-benefit analysis, shift-share techniques and self-
assessment interview techniques all designed to build robust counter-factual scenarios.  Each 
approach should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis due to the fact that each has its merits 
and demerits in different circumstances.  As Turok (1991) outlined, "Each approach is 
confronted by acknowledged technical and practical difficulties" (p. 1547).  This paper has 
concentrated on the self-assessment approach using face-to-face interviews with the owner-
managers of assisted firms and has provided an innovative method (building on the earlier 
work of Lenihan, 1999 and 2001) to enable the dimensions of partial deadweight to be 
incorporated into the overall estimate of deadweight.  Although specific estimates have been 
presented which gives an overall assessment of 50 per cent net additionality for EI assistance 
it must be remembered that these estimates relate only to one specific year and to a sample of 
only 42 firms.  Nevertheless, what is important is the methodological approach adopted in the 
paper rather than the results themselves.  Our approach has provided a rigorous, structured, 
but at the same time user-friendly approach to evaluating the effects of financial assistance to 
individual firms.   
 
One of the inherent difficulties of applying this methodology in the context of EI financial 
assistance to industry is the fact that a large proportion of that assistance was in the form of 
preference shares (see Figure 1) which are repayable to EI.  To develop estimates of 
deadweight  which are effectively more suited to the concept of a non-repayable grant regime 
are problematic and have not been addressed in this paper.  For that reason, it has not been 
possible to develop a comparative dimension to this study because most comparator studies 
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are more accurately developing estimates of "grant deadweight" which is not what is being 
measured here. 
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